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Metaphysics of soul and self in Plotinus
Gwenaëlle Aubry
One of the great singularities of the philosophy of Plotinus consists in thinking of the 
self1 for its own sake and, in particular, in producing a concept of it diff erent from that 
of soul.2 Th is philosophical breakthrough is inseparable from the discovery of immedi-
ate refl exivity, that is, the subject’s ability to apprehend itself independently of its rela-
tion to an object or to another subject.3 In Plotinus, however, this refl exivity occurs 
only in an interrogative form, which can be read, in particular, in Enn. I.1[53] and Enn. 
VI.4[22]. In other words, it does not, as in Descartes, assume the form of an intuition by 
means of which the subject, grasping itself as consciousness, would, at the same time, 
have an evident revelation of its essence. In Enn. I.1 and Enn. VI.4, the two refl exive 
questions serve as preludes to two enquiries involving the concepts of soul and human 
being, but also manifesting the irreducibility of the self to either of them. It is precisely 
this irreducibility that will interest us: we will see how Plotinus, although he seems to 
think of the self by means of the connected notions of soul and human being, but also 
of individual or even of consciousness, ceaselessly produces and renews a gap between 
them and the self. It is on the gap between soul and self that our attention will focus 
more particularly, both because it carries the others along with it, and because these 
two concepts are also susceptible of diff erent meanings in Plotinus: just as he allows 
levels of the soul, so he is also prepared to accept levels of the self. And yet, they do not 
coincide. Th e self properly so called, which Plotinus refers to as the hēmeis, is distinct 
both from the essential or separated soul and from the soul linked to the body. Situated 
rather than defi ned, it cannot be substantifi ed. To use Plotinian terminology, the hēmeis 
is neither god nor animal, but rather the power to become either one. Th ese two possi-
ble and exclusive identifi cations depend on the orientation it gives to its consciousness. 
Consciousness therefore does not appear, as it will in Descartes, as a revelation of iden-
tity, but as a means of identifi cation.
I should like to point out not only this irreducibility of the “self ” to the soul, but also the 
fundamental role it plays in the Plotinian system: to show how it is that by which Plotinian 
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metaphysics integrates an ethics, or, again, that by which the necessity of procession leaves 
room for the free choice of conversion.
DEGREES OF THE SOUL AND THE METAPHYSICS OF PROCESSION
The separated soul
Another singular aspect of the philosophy of Plotinus is that it affi  rms the existence of a 
separated soul,4 which remains in the Intellect and alien to both the powers and the pas-
sions of the body. Th is doctrine was to be rejected by the later Neoplatonists, particularly 
Iamblichus and Proclus (Steel 1978), but it occupies a fundamental place in Plotinian 
thought. Th us, we shall have to enquire into the connection, articulating it with the other 
singular point in Plotinus: his conception of the self.
Th is separated soul is the object of an experience that can be described as foundational, 
and which is described in the fi rst person in Enn. IV8[6]:
Oft en, awakening from my body to myself, having become external to everything 
else and internal to myself, contemplating such a wonderful beauty, certain then 
more than ever, that I belong to the higher world, activating the best life, becoming 
identical to the divine, and establishing myself in it, having attained this supreme 
activity and established myself above every other intelligible, when, aft er this rest 
in the divine, I descend from the Intellect to reasoning, I wonder how I could ever 
have descended in this way, and now again, how my soul was ever able to come to 
be inside a body, if it is such as it appeared by itself, even though it is in a body.   
 (Enn. IV.8[6] 1.1–11)5
As it is described here, this experience is at the same time that of a separation from 
the body – designated as an “awakening” – and of a presence to oneself. Nevertheless, it 
includes a fl ip side, or negative aspect: the experience of the “descent” or of falling back 
into the body, which, even more than the experience of separation, inspires astonishment, 
to the point of serving as prelude to one of the guiding questions of Plotinus’ philosophy: 
“How I could ever have descended in this way, and now again, how was my soul ever able 
to come to be inside a body?” (ll. 8–10). When formulated in this way, this question is 
consonant with the refl exive questions of other treatises which will be discussed below: if 
the Plotinian subject grasps itself only in an interrogative form, that is, not as something 
obvious but as something strange, it is because it undergoes the experience of several 
modes of relation to itself. Th e problem that then arises is that of which one defi nes it 
properly.
Th rough successive equivalences, the experience of self described by the fi rst lines of 
Enn. IV.8 is also presented as an experience of the “divine” and of the “Intellect” (nous). 
Such, then, is the apparently paradoxical thesis that Plotinus maintains: the separate soul 
is divine, and yet it is in us; it is an intellect, but also a soul, or again, more precisely, it 
is “being-soul”, the essential soul, simultaneously pure form and pure energeia.6 In Enn. 
V3[49], Plotinus formulates this paradox in yet another way: strictly speaking, the intel-
lective soul cannot be counted among the parts of the soul, and yet, it is indeed ours 
(hēmeteron); in fact, he continues, “it is ours without being ours … It is ours when we 
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use it; it is not ours when we do not use it”.7 Here the distinction, to which we shall 
return, is already indicated between the soul and the self understood as “us”, or as hēmeis. 
By “soul”, Enn. V.3 here means dianoia, the soul that is not intellective but discursive, 
which, as Plotinus writes, “we always use”, unlike the fi rst one.8 Th e inaugural lines of 
Enn. IV.8 described nothing other than the negative experience of the “descent” into the 
body as being that of the Intellect’s falling back into reasoning. Intellective thought, noēsis, 
thus appears as essential activity, energeia, or else as the life of the separate soul (cf. Enn. 
V.3[49].8.30–57; I.1[53].13.5–8). Like the total Intellect, and each of the intellects of which 
it is composed, the higher soul is characterized by intuitive thought, that is, by the simul-
taneous, inarticulated and non-propositional grasp of a complex content – comparable to 
a glance that embraces all the features of a face in a single vision (cf. Enn. IV.4[28].1.21–5 ; 
Emilsson 2007: 185–91).
We can remain strangers forever to this essential mode of being and thinking: or, 
as treatise Enn. V.3 says, we possibly never make use of it. Enn. V.1[10] opens with the 
acknowledgement of this fundamental ignorance: “Yet what can it be that has brought 
it about that the souls forget the god who is their father, and that they are as ignorant of 
themselves as they are of him, although they are parts that come from above, and in general 
belong to him?” (Enn. V.1[10].1.1–3).
Th e soul’s forgetfulness of the Intellect is also a forgetting of its own intellective origin – 
an origin that nevertheless has not come and gone, nor does it belong to a mythic past, 
but that remains in a state of unperceived presence. Th is forgetfulness is characteristic of 
pre-philosophical consciousness. Unaware of its dignity, soul is fascinated by externality: 
the body, the sensible. Narcissistic, it prefers its refl ection to itself, ignorant of the fact that 
without it, this refl ection, which is merely the eff ect of its power, could not subsist (cf. 
Enn. I.6[1].8.8–16; P. Hadot 1976). In order to tear the soul away from this mirage, it must 
be restored in its self-esteem, that is, recalled to the divine that it harbours. Th e gnōthi 
seauton which, for Plotinus as for Plato, serves as a prelude to philosophy, thus signifi es, 
as much as “Know yourself ”, “Know your worth” and “Become once again what you are” 
– and what in truth you have never ceased being, but of which you have lost awareness 
(cf. Verbeke 1997, Aubry 2007).
One must ask, however, what exactly is the status of this self that is rediscovered in the 
Intellect and the experience of which was described in Enn. IV.8.What remains in it of the 
personal self, the concrete, incarnate individual? Th at it is identical to the essential soul, 
so be it: but can it, as such, still be described as an individual?
Distinctions are necessary here, which manifest the complexity of the Plotinian thought 
of the self: in the fi rst place, this essential self constituted by the separated soul must indeed 
be distinguished from the hēmeis and from what we may call the biographical subject, 
that is, the bearer of a history, a memory, and the form of consciousness that is linked to 
them.9 In Enn. IV.3[27], Plotinus thus develops the singular theory of the two memories: 
two distinct memories correspond to the separated soul and to the soul linked to the body, 
one that preserves the intelligible trace of the object, the other, the sensible trace (Enn. 
IV.3[27].31.28–31). Freed from the body, the soul preserves the memory of its friends, its 
children and its fatherland for a while; then, gradually, it forgets them: “Th e good soul is 
forgetful … It is light and by itself ” (ibid.: 32.18–21). Th is is why Socrates, having risen 
back up to the intelligible, does not recall that he has done philosophy (Enn. I.4[28].1.5), 
nor even when he contemplates that it is he, Socrates, who contemplates (ibid.: 2.1–3).
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Like memory and individual history, consciousness disappears in the Intellect. More 
precisely, it gives way to a feeling of presence in which the duality between subject and 
object is abolished. In this state, Plotinus writes, we are “only potentially ourselves” (Enn. 
IV.4[28].2.5–8). We merge with that which we contemplate: “Th e self (autos) is all things 
and both are one” (ibid.: 2.22). In the Intellect, then, we are no longer “we”, but we are 
beings: “both what is ours and we are brought back to being” (Enn. VI.5[23].7.1). Here, 
none can say “it’s me up to this point” (7.15).10
Th is state in which the subject no longer experiences itself as such, but in its unity 
with being and with the others, is nevertheless designated by Plotinus as the site of its 
greatest proximity to itself, at the same time as it is genuine self-knowledge: “Being in this 
way, we are more than anything conscious of ourselves (hautois synetoi), and we acquire 
knowledge of ourselves as we make ourselves one” (Enn. V.8.[31].11.31–3). Th us, synesis 
is opposed to the refl exive consciousness which, just as dianoia fragments the contents 
of noēsis, divides what was grasped as a unity into a duality:11 “Th is identity is a kind of 
immediate sense (synesis) and consciousness of the self (synaisthēsis hautou), which itself 
must take great care not to distance itself from itself, by wanting to sense too much” (Enn. 
V.8[31].11.23–4). Th is, then, is what Pierre Hadot (1997: 40) has called “the paradox of the 
human personal self ”: it is when we are least aware of ourselves that we are most ourselves.
Still, the question arises of what the subject, thus identifi ed with the intellective soul 
and unburdened of all biographical content, then grasps of itself. At this essential level, 
can we still speak of identity? Of individuality? Th is question joins another controversial 
one: that of whether or not Plotinus accepted the existence of Forms of individuals.12 Th is 
problem cannot be dealt with here for its own sake.13 However, an attentive reading of the 
texts shows that Plotinus does indeed admit an intelligible principle of distinction between 
individuals which, however, cannot be identifi ed with a Form, but must be identifi ed, in 
the fi rst place, with the original distinction between intellective souls (cf. Enn. IV.3[27] 
8.15–16; V.8 [31].10.1–18), and then with the logos that is associated with them.14 To 
each soul-intellect is added a logos that contains not only the essential qualities of Man as 
such (Enn. II.6[17].1.17; VI.1[42].20.19–20), but also – and this is the originality of the 
Plotinian thesis – the diff erences, which are not just specifi c, but also individual (Enn. 
V.7[18].1.21, 1.23, 3.5–6; V.9[5].12.5–11).
Th is principle of individual distinction must, of course, be distinguished from the 
concrete individual. Yet it is not the negation of that individual, but rather its foundation. 
Th e paradox of the Plotinian personal self is thus illuminated: if, for Plotinus, one is never 
more oneself than when one is no longer conscious of oneself, this is because the subject 
identifi ed with its essential soul is not abolished in the universal. Rather, it is identifi ed 
with the very source of its individuality, that is, with the singular viewpoint of its intellect 
upon the total Intellect, as well as with the logos that bears the power of its own becoming.
At this point, then, one can indeed identify the separated soul, the soul as ousia, and the 
essential self. Although the essential self is already individuated, it is not merged with the 
conscious, incarnate biographical self. As we shall see, it is nevertheless, for the Plotinian 
subject, a possible identity. Indeed, the notion of a separated soul orients Plotinian ethics, 
which has no other goal than to transform this constant but ordinarily unperceived pres-
ence into a conscious presence. Far from being immediate or mechanical, this transfor-
mation is given as a demanding, normed itinerary, whose various stages correspond to 
various degrees of virtue: the civic virtues, which are those of the soul still connected to 
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the body; the cathartic virtues, by the exercise of which it separates itself from the body; 
fi nally, the contemplative virtues (I.2[19]). Th is ethical itinerary, and we shall return to 
this point, is inseparably a trajectory of consciousness, which gradually turns away from 
the body to orient itself towards the separated soul. Several of Plotinus’ treatises allow this 
itinerary not only to be seen, but to be carried out. Th ey can be read as effi  cacious texts, 
which aim to bring about this mutation of consciousness. Th is is the case with Enn. I.1[53] 
(see Aubry 2004), but also with Enn. IV.8[6] which, opening with the inaugural experience 
of the fall from noēsis to dianoia, ends with the evocation of the separated soul; or again 
with Enn. V.1[10], whose structure is rather close, since it leads from the souls’ forgetful-
ness of their divine origin to attention (prosokhē), that is, to that form of consciousness 
that knows how to leave itself open to the “voices from above” (Enn. V.1.[10].12.12–20).
In truth, then, the Plotinian beyond is very close: to reach it, it is enough to make 
oneself deaf to the tumult of the body, to release oneself from narcissistic fascination. For 
Plotinus, Odysseus represents the anti-Narcissus: he is the one who was able to resist the 
spells of the sensible, the charms of Circe and of Calypso (Enn. I.6[1].8.18–20). Yet the 
Plotinian Odyssey is a return to something that is always-already-there, which is the locus 
in us of a divine autarky, lucidity and happiness.
The lower powers of the soul and dianoia
Yet we must now return to the question of Enn. IV.8[6].1.9–10: “How could my soul ever 
come to be inside a body?” Th is question, ordinarily designated as being that of the descent 
of the soul, must, in fact, be formulated more precisely:
 • First, because, strictly speaking, for Plotinus the soul does not descend. What descends, 
or mixes with the body to animate it, is the power, the dynamis, that emanates from 
the separated soul.
 • In its confrontation with the body and with temporality, noēsis is transformed into 
dianoia. Th is is the moment by which the soul is truly constituted qua soul, in its 
diff erence from the Intellect. As such, it participates, like the fi rst, in the necessity of 
procession.
 • Th e descent can be considered as a fall or a fault only when dianoia and the conscious-
ness linked to it, forgetful of the separated soul, are completely oriented towards the 
body.
One must therefore distinguish between these various moments of procession by seeing 
what concepts of the soul and what concepts of the self correspond to them, and how the 
distance between them designates the very locus of Plotinian ethics.
DYNAMIS AND “DESCENT”
As early as chapter 2 of Enn. IV.8[6], Plotinus states a principle: “It is not a bad thing for 
the soul to provide the body with the power of good and being, since it is not true that 
all providence applied to lower reality prevents this providential agent from remaining in 
what is best” (2.24–5).
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Th is principle applies, in the fi rst place, to the mode of government of the World Soul. 
For the higher part of this soul “is situated above the heaven, sending its lowest power 
within it” (2.32–3). In this way, the World Soul is “always directed toward those things, 
setting this universe in order with a power that is completely detached” (2.52–3). Here it 
clearly appears that the World Soul does not “descend”. What is “sent” into the world is 
not it, but its “lowest power” (dynamis). Yet it is precisely because the World Soul does 
not descend that it is able to govern the universe, to set it in order into a cosmos, a beauti-
ful totality. Th is point of doctrine is explicitly formulated elsewhere, for instance at Enn. 
IV.3[27].6.21: “Th e souls that incline toward the intelligible world have a greater power”; 
or else Enn. II.9[33].2, where one reads that the World Soul governs “simply by looking at 
what is before it, thanks to its wonderful power. Th e more it devotes itself to contempla-
tion, the more it is beautiful and powerful” (15–16).
Th is description of the mode of governance of the World Soul is nothing other than 
an application of the Plotinian model of causality. Th is states that from every being in act 
(energeiai) there necessarily emanates an active, productive power (dynamis), which in 
turn is the cause of a new being and a new act. Th is model applies fi rst to the causality of 
the One-Good, which, although it is perfect, is beyond act.15 However, it also holds, beyond 
the fi rst principle, for all of procession, so that one can deduce from it the main features 
of such procession: necessity (causality is not the result of a choice), continuity (dynamis 
ensures the sustained presence of the cause to the eff ect, which it transcends), and degra-
dation (the eff ect is inferior to its cause, and is, in turn, the source of a diminished power) 
(e.g. Enn. V.4[7].1.23–8). Th is is the model that dictates here Plotinus’ affi  rmation that 
the power of the World Soul is all the greater the more intense its act of contemplation is.
Yet the same model also holds for the individual soul. As we have seen, the separated 
soul is also an energeia, a perfect and impassible act of contemplation. It is therefore, as 
such, at the beginning of an emanated power. For the individual soul as for the World 
Soul, however, Plotinus emphasizes that it is this power, this dynamis, and not the soul 
itself, that descends and is mixed with the body. Th is is why the Aristotelian defi nition of 
the soul as fi rst entelechy of the body16 must be opposed by the assertion that the soul is 
itself in act, already entelekheia, without the body, and that only for this reason there can 
be a body. Th us, the synamphoteron, that is, the living body, is not a mixture of body and 
soul, but only of the body and the power emanated from the soul. If it exists, Plotinus 
writes, it is “by the mere presence of the soul, not because this soul itself gives itself to the 
couple, but because it creates the nature of the animal from the qualifi ed body and from 
a kind of light it gives” (Enn. I.1[53].7.1–4). Th us, one must answer the Gnostics that “it 
is not because the soul inclines that it produces, but rather because it does not incline” 
(Enn. II.9[33].4.6–7).
It is at the conjunction of the powers emanated from the World Soul and the separated 
individual soul that the organic compound is constituted – or again, that the “man without 
qualities” present in the Intellect will be transformed into a concrete particular. Once 
again, however, two moments must be distinguished here: the power emanated from the 
World Soul constitutes what Plotinus calls the “living body”, or else the “qualifi ed body”.17 
By this, one must understand the body endowed with the vegetative power, and with an 
inferior form, not yet individualized, of sensation.18 To this living body, Enn. VI.4[22] also 
attributes an epitēdeiotēs, or a disposition to receive such-and-such a soul.19 However, the 
“qualifi ed” body does not really become an individual body until the power that comes 
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from the individual soul is added to the power emanated from the World Soul. Th e World 
Soul still has a role to play in this conjunction: it is she who “distributes” individual souls, 
like dancers in a choreography, into one animated body or another (cf. Enn. VI.7[38].7.10; 
IV.3[27].12.17–19, 37–9). Yet a spontaneous motion is added to this determination.20 
Indeed, Plotinus writes of the divine soul that it “leaps (hoion exethoren), as it were, out 
of the all into a part” (Enn. VI.4[22].16.29–30). Th is is when it becomes the soul of a body. 
And it is within this relation that particularization must be situated: whereas it was only 
potentially particular in the Intellect,21 the soul becomes particular in act.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE DIANOIA
Here, however, a diffi  culty must be illuminated. If the higher soul does not descend, if 
only its emanated dynamis is mixed with the body, how should we understand Plotinus’ 
words that the soul “leaps” towards its own body? Th e answer is that this motion is what 
constitutes the soul qua soul, in its diff erence from the Intellect, or again that by which 
noēsis is modifi ed into dianoia. Indeed, dianoia is the result of the encounter of intellec-
tive thought with time. It deploys the immediacy and totality of intuition into successive 
moments, to respond to the demands of the body, of action, and of a life diff racted by 
temporality (Enn. III.7[45].11). Th us, it must be considered “the sign of a diminishment 
of the Intellect” (Enn. IV.3[27].18.1–7): and it is indeed this diminished, less intense, less 
lucid life that was attested by the liminary experience of Enn. IV.8. At the same time, 
however, this weakening does not aff ect the separated soul, and constitutes the soul in 
its proper function of animation and organization of the sensible. Th us, the soul’s dian-
oetic constitution is still inscribed in the order of procession. Still in Enn. IV.8, Plotinus 
emphasizes its necessity: “Th e function of the more rational soul is to think, but not only 
to think. What would diff erentiate it from the Intellect? For it has added something else 
to the fact of being intelligent, such that it did not remain Intellect” (3.21–4). Once again, 
it is this necessity that is indicated by the insistence on the soul’s “double nature” and its 
“amphibious” character (Enn. IV.8[6].4.31–5; cf. also Enn. IV.7[2].13).
Th us, no more than the gift  of power in which animation consists can the soul’s rela-
tion to the particular body be truly considered as a “descent” or a fall. It is, of course, a 
distancing, or a secession from the intelligible totality: as such, however, it constitutes 
the soul in its proper nature, and therefore always participates in the order of procession.
THE SITUATION OF THE HĒMEIS
At this point, then, one sees the various levels of the soul becoming arranged: that is, 
always according to the order of procession: the higher soul; its lower powers, which are 
mixed with the body; and, intermediary between the separated soul and the animated 
body, dianoia.
Th e question then arises of whether, and to what extent, these levels of the soul can be 
made to correspond to levels of the “self ”. We have seen that the separated soul could be 
identifi ed with the essential individual. Yet what about the soul (or, more precisely, the 
soul’s powers) that is (or are) mixed with the body, and the dianoia?
 METAPHYSICS OF SOUL AND SELF IN PLOTINUS 317
Plotinus raises this question explicitly, in the refl exive form of questioning by the hēmeis 
of its own identity:
We, however … Who are “we”? Are we “that one”, or are we that which has 
approached [to “that one”], and is subject to becoming in time? … It is true that 
now another man, who wanted to exist, has added himself to that man, and once he 
found us … he attributed himself to us, and he added himself to that man who we 
were originally … and thus we have become both, and more than once we are no 
longer who we were before, and we are the one that we then added on to ourselves, 
when the man we were stops being active, and, in a way, stops being present.   
 (Enn. VI.4[22].14.16–31)
Th is text describes the hēmeis as the “couple” (to synamphō) of two men, who are pre-
cisely the separated soul and the animated body. It also appears, however, that the hēmeis 
cannot be identifi ed with either of them: both are in it, without either of them being it, 
properly speaking. Nor do they constitute it as elements, but, rather, as alternating and 
alternative presences that are also “activities”: when we are the second man, it is because 
the fi rst one “stops being active”.
We see here, once again, what is singular about Plotinian refl exivity: the act by which 
the subject grasps itself reveals to it not its identity, but its duality. Th rough it, it does not 
attain itself in its essence (the separated soul, the fi rst man), but in its diff erence from the 
latter. Th is structure is also found elsewhere. Th us, in Enn. I.1[53], one reads yet another 
refl exive question: aft er enumerating the various contents of interiority, from the passions 
to noēsis, by way of opinion and refl ection, Plotinus asks: “Th at which searches, examines 
and decides these questions: whatever can it be?” (1.9–11). Once again, however, this 
question does not preside over the unifi cation of the various inner contents. If the hēmeis 
is able to apprehend them without mediation, it does not discover itself as what unifi es 
them, to the very degree to which it is conscious of them. At fi rst, it grasps itself only as 
this multiplicity, not as what totalizes it: “polla gar hēmeis”, Plotinus thus writes, “we are 
several” (Enn. I.1[53].9.7). Th us, Enn. I.1 will initially distribute this multiplicity between 
three distinct terms: the separated soul, the soul that uses the body, and “a third thing 
made up of the soul and the body”(1.2–5; Cf. Plato, Alc. 130a). Th is movement seems to 
attest an oscillation between two conceptions of the subject: the refl exive subject and the 
subject of attribution (the logical or ontological substrate). What in fact appears, however, 
is that once again the refl exive subject – the hēmeis – does not allow itself to be reduced to 
the subject of attribution. It cannot be identifi ed with any of the three terms among which 
noēsis, refl ection, opinion and passions are distributed. It is distinct both from the soul 
when alone, or separated, and from the compound of soul and body. As far as the “soul 
using the body” (Enn. I.1[53].3)is concerned, the question is more complex. Still in Enn. 
I.1, Plotinus lists the operations that are at the foundation of the soul’s power (hēgemonia) 
over the animal: refl ection, dianoia, opinion, doxa, notions, noēseis; and he concludes by 
saying “and this is precisely what we are, above all (malista)” (7.16–17). Here we see that 
the hēmeis is not identifi ed with the soul using the body, nor even with dianoia, but is 
simply situated on the same level as these. And this situation is presented as dominant, 
but not as exclusive. Th is is why Plotinus specifi es, shortly aft erwards: “Th e ‘hēmeis’ is 
thus twofold: either one takes the beast into account, or else one considers only what 
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is already above it” (10.5–7). Th e surprising “above all” (malista) at the end of Plotinus’ 
phrase can be explained as follows: the hēmeis can also be situated higher or lower than 
dianoia, according to whether it identifi es with the animate body or the separated soul, 
with the second or the fi rst man. Although it is there “above all”, it can also be elsewhere.
We thus see, to conclude on this point, that if the essential self can be identifi ed with the 
separated soul, on the other hand the hēmeis, or refl exive subject, must be distinguished 
both from the latter and from the body animated by the powers that proceed from it. Th e 
separated soul and the animal, the fi rst and the second man, are in it without being it. Th e 
consciousness by which it grasps itself does not grant it access to its identity, but only to 
this constitutive duality and to the various inner contents that can be referred to it. Th e 
hēmeis can only be situated at a level intermediary between the two men, or else between 
the separated soul and the living compound, but this situation is itself mobile, so that the 
hēmeis cannot be strictly identifi ed with the dianoia either. We must now see how this 
dynamic character of the Plotinian subject is what constitutes it as the subject of ethics.
THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE HĒMEIS AND THE ETHICS OF CONVERSION
The hēmeis and the levels of the soul
Like Enn. I.1[53], Enn. V.3[49] underlines both the proximity and the diff erence between 
the hēmeis and dianoia. Th e hēmeis is here designated as “the main part of the soul inter-
mediary between two powers” (Enn. V.3[49.].3.35–8). Th e rest of the treatise will identify 
these two powers as sensation and intelligence. One might therefore be tempted to read 
an identifi cation here between the hēmeis and the soul qua soul, that is, the dianoia. A bit 
earlier in the treatise, however, Plotinus writes, as we have seen, that intelligence belongs 
to us, but not to the soul.22 Hēmeis and soul are thus distinguished here, and they are so 
in that some powers can be attributed to the hēmeis that cannot be attributed to the soul: 
it would make no sense to say of noēsis that it “belongs to the soul”, since the latter, as we 
have seen, is constituted qua soul, that is, as dia-noia, the deployment within time of an 
intuitive content, only in its diff erence from the nous. Th us, Enn. V.3 makes an additional 
distinction between the self-knowledge of dianoia and that of the hēmeis; for dianoia, to 
know itself in its essence is to know itself as coming from the Intelligence, but also as dis-
tinct from the latter; for the hēmeis, in contrast, to know itself is to know the Intelligence 
as constituting its essence (4.23–30). Th e dianoia is an image of the Intelligence, and this 
is what constitutes it as such. Th e hēmeis, for its part, is what can actualize the Intelligence 
as one of its powers.23
Th is also holds true for sensation: here again, one can say of it that it is “ours” – but not 
that it belongs to dianoia, nor to the median part of the soul, since it is to the animated 
body that it must be attributed: “It is agreed that sensation is considered to be always ours 
– indeed, we always sense – whereas for the Intellect, there is room for doubt, because we 
do not always use it and because it is separated” (Enn. V.3[49].3.39–41).
Th e terminology here is very close to that of Enn. VI.4: like the two men, the two 
powers that correspond to them (one, sensation, defi ning the animal, the other, intel-
ligence, defi ning the separated soul), are the subject of an alternative “usage”. Just as Enn. 
VI.4[22] designated “us” as being adventitious man “more than once”, so, here, it is said 
that we “always sense”. And just as the fi rst man was said to be “inactive” when the second 
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man is active in us, so here it is said that “we do not always use it”. Th e parallelism between 
those fomulations is worth noticing, even though the vocabulary of usage substitutes for 
that of activity.
If the hēmeis cannot be identifi ed with the median part of the soul, any more than with 
the separated soul, it is because, unlike the soul, it is not the subject of defi nitional powers. 
Whereas the separated soul has noēsis as its essential act, the median part of the soul is 
constituted as dianoia, and the living body is the subject of sensation and passions, the 
hēmeis, for its part, is what can make use in turn of either one of these powers.
HĒMEIS AND CONSCIOUSNESS
In this irreducibility of the hēmeis to the various levels of the soul, we may see an eff ect of 
Plotinus’ discovery of the diff erence between subject-consciousness and subject-substrate.
Th at the hēmeis is not a substance follows from the fact that for Plotinus, only the 
separated soul can be said to be ousia. Th e animated body itself, like every sensible reality, 
cannot be said to be such (see Chiaradonna 2002). However, the fact that the hēmeis is not 
the substrate of defi nite operations either results from the connection Plotinus establishes 
between it and consciousness. Th is connection is more intimate than the one between 
hēmeis and dianoia; and it is precisely, as is shown by the following text, that by virtue of 
which the hēmeis cannot be identifi ed with a part of the soul, but rather with what Plotinus 
calls “the total soul”:
Everything present in the soul is not for that reason conscious, but … it reaches 
“us” when it reaches consciousness.24 When one of the soul’s activities is exercised 
without communicating anything to consciousness, that activity does not reach 
the total soul. It follows that “we” know nothing of this activity, because “we” are 
connected to consciousness (meta tou aisthētikou), and “we” are not part of the 
soul, but the total soul.  (Enn. V.1[10].12.5–10)
It is thus this connection with consciousness that brings it about that the hēmeis cannot 
be identifi ed with one level of the soul but is, at least in principle, that to which these levels 
are all present, and which totalizes them. Nevertheless, this text must be read together 
with those from Enn. VI.4[22] and Enn. V.3[49], already cited, which designated the two 
men – and with them noēsis and sensation – as presences or activities that are not simul-
taneous, but alternating and alternative. Th is implies that we should further elucidate the 
link between the hēmeis and consciousness.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND IDENTIFICATION
A passage from Enn. I.1[53] sheds light on the formulation, still vague, of Enn. V.1[10]: 
“‘we’ are linked to consciousness”. Here, precisely, the question is raised of the degree to 
which the hēmeis can not only be associated with dianoia, but even identifi ed with the 
separated soul: “Are we not also what is prior to this part (that is, the middle part of the 
soul)?” Th e answer is as follows: “Yes, as long as we become aware of it: for we do not 
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always use all that we have, but only when we orient the middle part upwards, or in the 
contrary direction; must we not say that we make use of all that we make pass from poten-
tiality or disposition to act?” (Enn. I.1[53].11.4–8).
Even more than as the subject of consciousness, the hēmeis appears here as what pre-
sides over its orientation “upwards, or in the contrary direction” – in other words, towards 
the fi rst or the second man, towards intelligence or towards sensation. Th is realization is 
at the same time described as a “making use” and an actualization. Yet it is also that by 
which what was merely “ours” becomes “us”. Th us, “we are also” what is superior to the 
middle part of the soul – that is, the separated soul – when we become aware of its pres-
ence in us: in other words, this realization is inseparably an identifi cation. Consciousness 
is therefore not so much constitutive of identity as it is a condition for identifi cation. We 
are not what we are aware of: quite the contrary, we become what we become aware of. If 
the refl exive question ends up in the acknowledgement of a duality, becoming aware, for 
its part, is equivalent to the choice of an identity.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONVERSION
Th ere is nothing necessary about such a process. As we have said, consciousness, in its 
pre-philosophical stage, is spontaneously directed downward; this is why Plotinus writes 
in Enn. V.3[49] that “we always sense”. Yet it depends on us to prolong or to reverse this 
orientation, and this is the point at which Plotinian ethics enters the picture. As we have 
seen, the gap between the soul and the Intellect, its union with the body, is not by itself a 
“fault” or a “descent”, but participates in the movement of procession. Th ere is a fault only 
when the government (hēgemonia) of the body becomes exclusive concern (kēdemonia) 
for it. Entirely swallowed up by the body, under the sway of narcissistic illusion, conscious-
ness then becomes incapable of refl ecting the other activities of the soul and other powers 
of the hēmeis: Plotinus compares it to a broken “mirror”, in which “discursive reason and 
Intelligence exercise their activity without refl ection” (Enn. I.4[46].10.17–19). It is this 
same image of the mirror that is broken, or such that one can see oneself in it only as 
fragmented – the “mirror of Dionysus” – which elsewhere comes to express the soul’s 
fascination with its own body and its descent into it (Enn. IV.3[27].12.1–2). In fact, it is in 
this bad orientation of consciousness, both obsessed and troubled by the body, that the 
true “descent” must be seen.
Th e necessary process of particularization, by virtue of which the essential “self ” 
becomes an incarnate “self ”, then yields to the risk of parcelization: the subject, completely 
merged with its body, cuts itself off  from the others, entering into that regime of division, 
of mutual inhibition, which characterizes corporeal reality (cf. Enn. III.6[26].6.33–64) ; but 
it no longer has access to its own totality, either. Th us, as early as Enn. IV.8[6], the Platonic 
drama of the descent is re-translated by Plotinus in epistemic terms: the descent must be 
understood, above all, as the forgetfulness by the soul of its intelligible rootedness, that is, 
as the obliteration of some of its faculties, the deactivation of some of its powers (cf. Enn. 
IV.8[6].8.1–13; I.8[51].14.44–6).
Th e point, then – and this, as we have said, is the movement obeyed by several Plotinian 
treatises – is to recall the subject to the consciousness of all the powers it bears within 
itself in order that, ultimately, it may be able to direct its attention towards the separated 
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soul. In other words, the goal is still to give rise to a trajectory of consciousness whose 
various moments would be the following: pre-philosophical consciousness, fragmented, 
narcissistic, which has no other object than its own body (kēdemonia); the totalizing 
consciousness by which the hēmeis discovers that all the powers of the soul are “its own”; 
selective consciousness (prosokhē), oriented towards the separated soul alone; fi nally, the 
pure presence (synesis) in which all duality between the intellect and its object is abolished.
Th is trajectory of consciousness is inseparably an epistemic and an ethical trajectory: 
Enn. V.3 and Enn. I.1 thus manifest that the constant activity within us of the separated 
soul is the necessary condition for such everyday cognitive operations as judgement. 
Indeed, the latter is the placing in relation of the imprints, or typoi, issuing forth from 
sensible things, with the typoi issuing from the intelligible forms (Enn. V.3[49].2–3.11; 
I.1[53].7.9–16, 9.18–23), that is, the notions (noēseis). True reasoning can then be defi ned 
as the “activation of notions” (Enn. I.1[53].9.21). Th is process of the actualization of 
notions is also what Plotinus calls “reminiscence”, by which he defi nes cathartic virtue 
(cf. Enn. I.2[19].4.19–25; IV.3[27].25.30–33; V.3[49].2.7–14).
In this way, the movement of conversion is the reverse of that of procession: the deg-
radation of powers is reversed into an actualization of the potential, that is, of the traces 
left  in us by higher realities.25 However, while procession is necessary, conversion is con-
tingent, depending as it does on the choice of the hēmeis, who can remain forever cut off  
from its intelligible origin and its essential identity.26
In conclusion, then, we see that the association of hēmeis with consciousness prohibits 
the identifi cation of it with any specifi c level of soul. At the same time, Plotinus thus pro-
vides himself with a graduated conception of the subject, since he distinguishes between 
the hēmeis and the intelligible “self ”. It is in the latter – identical to the pure ousia, that is, 
the separated soul – that the foundation of individuality resides, together with the most 
intense life and an unalterable happiness. We have tried to show what was singular about 
these two theses, already in themselves. But the strength of Plotinus’ thought also resides 
in their articulation: in the affi  rmation both that something of us remains “up above”, so 
that happiness is a very close presence, and that it can nevertheless escape us, since this 
presence must still be actualized, and this actualization depends on a choice. Whereas his 
successors Iamblichus and Proclus were to deny the existence of the separated soul and to 
delegate conversion to theurgical ritual or to a purely cognitive process (see Westra 1987), 
Plotinus, for his part, is able to conceive both the permanent, impersonal subject and the 
ethical subject defi ned as what makes the choice of its identity.
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NOTES
 1. Emphasized by Henri Bergson (2011), the fundamental role of Plotinian thought in the constitution of the 
notion of “Self ” is curiously undervalued in genealogies such as those of Vernant (1989), C. Taylor (1989) 
or Foucault (2001). For recent re-evaluations, see Remes & Sihvola (2008), as well as Aubry & Ildefonse 
(2008).
 2. Th is point was already noted by Dodds (1960). Let us specify at the outset that the notion of “self ” is 
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understood here in a broad sense, including both what is called in French “le moi” and “le soi”, that is, 
both the biographical, incarnate individual and the impersonal and/or essential identity.
 3. Plotinus thereby distinguishes himself from both Plato and Aristotle, who accept refl exivity only qua 
mediated by an object or by another subject.Cf. especially Brunschwig (1983, 1996).
 4. It has become frequent in the secondary literature to designate this soul as “undescended”. We will see 
below how this designation is inadequate, in so far as, strictly speaking, the soul never “descends” for 
Plotinus.
 5.  Translation is that of Pierre Hadot, retranslated by Michael Chase.
 6. Cf. I.1[53].2.2, 6, 8. On the problem of the demarcation between soul and Intellect, cf. Blumenthal (1993b, 
1996b).
 7. Enn. V.3[49].3.23–9 (Ἀλλ’οὐ ψυχῆς μὲν φήσομεν, ἡμέτερον δὲ νοῦν φήσομεν …).
 8. Ibid.: 3.28.
 9. If this distinction between the levels of the self structures the foundational works of P. Hadot (1980) and 
O’Daly (1973), contemporary research has, partly under the infl uence of the “philosophy of mind”, been 
mainly interested in this essential level (see Rappe 1996, Gerson 1997b). Remes (2007) reconstructs the 
question of the continuity between the essential self and the concrete personal self.
 10. εἶτ’οὐκ ἔχων ὅπῃ αὑτὸν στήσας ὁριεῖ καὶ μέχρι τίνος αὐτός ἐστιν.
 11. Cf. Enn. V.8.[31].11.5–12. See, along the same lines, Enn. IV.3[27].30.7–14, where consciousness is asso-
ciated with discourse, logos and with imagination, phantastikon, as well as Enn. I.4[46].10.21–34, where 
Plotinus writes: “Acts of consciousness risk weakening the acts they accompany, whereas if they are not 
accompanied by consciousness, acts are more pure, having more intensity and life.”
 12. Th e debate is abundant: see, in particular, Rist (1963, 1970), Armstrong (1977), Blumenthal (1966, 1998), 
Gerson (1994: 139–51), Kalligas (1997), Morel (1999), Petit (1999), Nikulin (2005), Remes (2005; 2007: 
32–59).
 13. It is discussed in Aubry (2008a), of which I take up the conclusions here.
 14. Cf. Enn. VI.7[38].5.2–3 (with the commentary of P. Hadot 1987: 214).
 15. On the subversion of the Aristotelian couple of potential and act implied by this model, and its application 
to the fi rst principle, see Aubry (2006).
 16. Aristotle, de An. II.1.412a19–414a28. On this progressive defi nition, see Ackrill (1979).
 17. ζῳωθὲν τὸ σῶμα; τὸ σῶμα τοιοῦτον/τοιόνδε. On the Plotinian terminology of the soul–body union, 
see Aubry (2004: 378–80).
 18. Th e texts do not all agree on this point. Some (Enn. VI.4[22].15) suggest that it is the individual soul that, 
at birth, endows with sensation the body already animated by the World Soul; others (Enn. I.1[53].8.18) 
explicitly make sensation an eff ect of the World Soul. Th is confl ict may be reduced, however, in so far as 
Plotinus distinguishes two forms of sensation: one, purely mechanical, is the pure reception of a pathos by 
the living body; the other, active and conscious, would already be a perception (as is well known, Greek 
has only one word, aisthēsis, for sensation and for perception). One may assume that the former is an 
eff ect of the World Soul, the latter of the individual soul.
 19. Enn. VI.4[22].15.2. On this notion of epitēdeiotēs, see Aubry (2008b).
 20. Th at is, neither constrained nor fully free. Cf. O’Brien (1977), D’Ancona (2003), Aubry (2012).
 21. οἷον δυνάμει τότε τὸ μέρος οὖσα, Enn. VI.4[22].16.36.
 22. Enn. V.3[49].3.23—4: ou psuchēs … hēmeteron de …
 23. On the irreducibility of the hēmeis both to the separated soul and to dianoia, may I refer to my reply 
(Aubry 2008c: 118 n. 29) to Chiaradonna (2008c). See also Lavaud (2002).
 24. Here, aisthēsis. We also fi nd the term antilēpsis at line 12. On the Plotinian vocabulary of consciousness, 
see, for an attempt of classifi cation, Schwyzer (1960), A. C. Lloyd (1964), Warren (1964).
 25. On the way in which the equivocity of dynamis (its twofold meaning of power/potentiality) comes to 
express in Plotinus the reciprocity of procession and conversion, cf. Aubry (2006).
 26. For this reason, I see in the hēmeis not a “pure potentiality” (as Tornau (2009) reproached me), but a power 
of choice and self-determination. On this link between hēmeis and proairesis, cf. Aubry (2004: 302–4); in 
the same sense, see Sorabji (2006: 119) as well as O’Daly (1973: 49).
